Libertarians-statement-Sullivan
Source: : Dan Sullivan in July, 2006 on the efforts of the Libertarian Reform Caucus Strategy (was: Beginning of the end) I don't think it is fair to equate political skills with emotionally laden terms and false dichotomies. Indeed, emotionalism and false dichotomies have always run rampant through the LP without its having rudimentary political skills. "Reform the LP" would not have had success if there wasn't at least some truth to their arguments, and one thing that is true is that the LP and its leaders are woefully lacking in political skill. LP members talk too much to themselves as if they were talking to the world, and on the occasions when they actually do talk to the world, it sounds like they are talking to themselves. I do not thing this means they have to sell out, although Henry's description of the LP platform process sounds like the LP is coming dangerously close to selling out, at least on the war. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart brilliantly stated the core dilemma of being a leader rather than a prophet. He is considered the greatest strategist of the 20th century, laying waste to the Clausewitz attrition strategy used in World War One. Unfortunately the Germans adopted his strategy from the outset, while the British did not follow it until Churchill came to power. Hart had particular comments for how strategy applies to political reformers: History bears witness to the vital part that the "prophets" have played in human progress -- which is evidence of the ultimate practical value of expressing unreservedly the truth as one sees it. Yet it also becomes clear that the acceptance and spreading of their vision has always depended on another class of men -- "leaders" who had to be philosophical strategists, striking a compromise between truth and men's receptivity to it. Their effect has often depended as much on their own limitations in perceiving the truth as on their practical wisdom in proclaiming it. The prophets must be stoned; that is their lot, and the test of their self- fulfillment. But a leader who is stoned may merely prove that he has failed in his function through a deficiency of wisdom, or through confusing his function with that of a prophet.... At the least, he avoids a more common fault of leaders, that of sacrificing the truth to expediency without ultimate advantage to the cause. For whoever habitually suppresses the truth in the interests of tact will produce a deformity from the womb of his thought. ... A possible solution of the problem is suggested by the reflection on strategic principles -- which point to the importance of maintaining an object consistently and, also, of pursuing it in a way adapted to circumstances. Opposition to the truth is inevitable, especially if it takes the form of a new idea, but the degree of resistance can be diminished by giving thought not only to the aim but to the method of approach. Avoid a frontal attack on a long established position; instead, seek to turn it by flank movement, so that a more penetrable side is exposed to the thrust of truth. But, in any such indirect approach, take care not to diverge from the truth -- for nothing is more fatal to its real advantage than to lapse into untruth. The art of the indirect approach can only be mastered, and its full scope appreciated, by study of and reflection upon the whole history of war. But we can at least crystallize the lessons into two simple maxims- one negative, the other positive. The first is that, in face of the overwhelming evidence of history, no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position. The second, that instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched. ... regrettable as it may seem to the idealist, the experience of history provides little warrant for the belief that real progress, and the freedom that makes progress possible, lies in unification. For where unification has been able to establish unity of ideas it has usually ended in uniformity, paralysing the growth of new ideas. And where the unification has merely brought about an artificial or imposed unity, its irksomeness has led through discord to disruption. Vitality springs from diversity -- which makes for real progress so long as there is mutual toleration, based on the recognition that worse may come from an attempt to suppress differences than from acceptance of them. For this reason, the kind of peace that makes progress possible is best assured by the mutual checks created by a balance of forces -- alike in the sphere of internal politics and of international relations. Avoid self-righteousness like the devil -- nothing is so self- blinding. In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there -- a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance. Helplessness induces hopelessness, and history attests that loss of hope and not loss of lives is what decides the issue of war. The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men. :Source: Strategy, pp 19-20 - - - - My take on this is that for the LP to be true to its principles yet effective politically, it must choose issues that are both consistent with those principles and accessible to the people it is trying to reach. It needn't have two different positions for two different audiences, but leaders should not dwell on gun rights at a NORML rally, nor dwell on loosening drug laws at an NRA meeting. Here are Hart's eight maxims of strategy. I think you will agree that LP leaders routinely violate these maxims and would be more effective if they followed them. Liddell-Hart's Eight Maxims of Strategy Adjust your end to your means. Clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. Do not bite off more than you can chew. Keep a clear sense of what is possible. Face facts while preserving faith. Confidence will be of no avail if the troops are run down. Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances. Recognize that alternatives exist but make sure they all bear on the object. Weigh the feasibility of attaining an objective against its contribution to the attainment of the end in mind. Choose the line (or course) of least expectation. Put yourself in your opposition's shoes and try to see what course of action he will see as least probable and thus not try to forestall. Exploit the line of least resistance -- so long as it can lead you to any objective that would contribute to your underlying object. Seize on opportunity -- but not any opportunity. Tactically, this refers to following up on success; strategically, it refers to the management and deployment of your reserves. Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives. Choose a single course of action that could have several objectives; do not let your actions reveal your objectives. This puts your opponent on the horns of a dilemma. It introduces uncertainty regarding that which is to be guarded against. Ensure that both plans and dispositions are flexible -- adaptable to circumstances. Include contingencies or next steps -- for success as well as failure. Organize and deploy your resources in ways that facilitate adaptation to either. Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard -- whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it. Unless your opponent is much inferior, do not attack until he has been disorganized and demoralized. Psychological warfare precedes physical warfare. Similarly, physical warfare can be psychological in nature. Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed. If at first you don't succeed, give up. Your reinforcements will likely be matched by the enemy. Moreover, successfully repulsing you the first time will morally strengthen him for the second. :Source: Liddell-Hart's eight maxims are also online at: http://home.att.net/~nickols/maxims.htm